Multilayer Nonlinear Processing for Information Privacy in Sensor
  Networks by He, Xin et al.
1Multilayer Nonlinear Processing for Information
Privacy in Sensor Networks
Xin He, Meng Sun, Student Member, IEEE, Wee Peng Tay, Senior Member, IEEE, and Yi Gong, Senior
Member, IEEE
Abstract—A sensor network wishes to transmit information to
a fusion center to allow it to detect a public hypothesis, but at
the same time prevent it from inferring a private hypothesis.
We propose a multilayer nonlinear processing procedure at each
sensor to distort the sensor’s data before it is sent to the fusion
center. In our proposed framework, sensors are grouped into
clusters, and each sensor first applies a nonlinear fusion function
on the information it receives from sensors in the same cluster
and in a previous layer. A linear weighting matrix is then used
to distort the information it sends to sensors in the next layer.
We adopt a nonparametric approach and develop a modified
mirror descent algorithm to optimize the weighting matrices
so as to ensure that the regularized empirical risk of detecting
the private hypothesis is above a given privacy threshold, while
minimizing the regularized empirical risk of detecting the public
hypothesis. Experiments on empirical datasets demonstrate that
our approach is able to achieve a good trade-off between the
error rates of the public and private hypothesis.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, information privacy, non-
parametric detection, sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices like
on-body sensors, smart home appliances, and smart phones
[1]–[4], massive amounts of data about users’ habits, routines
and preferences are being collected by service providers. Sen-
sors make observations, and sends their data to a fusion center
[5]–[8] to allow service providers to perform inferences that
can potentially improve the quality of life. However, the same
data can also be exploited to learn users’ private behaviors,
habits, lifestyle choices, or health conditions. An example of a
sensor network is illustrated in Fig. 1. The sensor network can
be an on-body sensor network, where the distributed sensors
include inertial measurement units (IMU), electrocardiography
(ECG), skin conductivity (SC) sensors and respiration sensors,
sending data to a fitness monitoring service provider or fusion
center. The IMU records motion acceleration information,
which can be used for activity classification. The ECG signal
and the data from the SC and respiration sensors can be used
for stress level detection. The sensor data may be used to
monitor the stress level and exercising habits of the user.
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Fig. 1. Information privacy in sensor networks.
These constitute the public hypothesis or inference the service
provider is authorized to perform. However, the same data
may also be used to discover some latent health issues of
the user, which constitute the private information. Since both
public and private information are embedded in the observed
data, distorting the observed data before sending to the fusion
center is crucial in protecting users’ privacy. Our goal is to
distort the data in such a way that the fusion center can still
infer the public information, while making it difficult for the
fusion center to infer the private information.
As the number of IoT devices is increasing, ensuring
users’ privacy has gained traction in both the IoT industry
and research community. For instance, Apple Inc. has re-
cently announced that it will incorporate differential privacy
mechanisms into its data collection process [9]. However,
most privacy preserving mechanisms like those based on
differential privacy, encryption or perturbation [10]–[12], [12]–
[19] proposed in the literature concerns data privacy, i.e.,
the prevention of any statistical algorithms operating on the
data from inferring much about each individual datum. For
example, the paper [20] proposes a convolution deep learning
approach to locate and blur the sensitive objects in an image.
This approach assumes the private or sensitive objects are
separable from the rest of the image. However, both public
and private information are often embedded in the same datum
in many situations. For example, information about both the
emotions and medical condition of a person are embedded in
the same ECG signal. Furthermore, by blurring the sensitive
object in an image indicates that such an object is present, and
may result in some privacy leakage.
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2We call the prevention of statistical inference information
privacy. A technical definition for information privacy was first
proposed by [21]. A minimax formulation was proposed by
[22], [23] to design privacy mappings or filters that are robust
to inference attacks. However, [22], [23] do not address the
information privacy metric of [21]. A nonparametric approach
in which data is first sanitized by mapping to a subspace was
proposed by [24], [25]. However, this approach is impractical
in a decentralized sensor network since the sanitization can
only be done by a trusted data curator who first aggregates
data from all sensors. Furthermore, no theoretical guarantees
for the level of information privacy achievable are available.
Practical nonparametric approaches to achieve information
privacy in the sense of [21] for decentralized sensor networks
were developed in [26], [27]. In [26], a nonlinear probabilistic
mapping is used to distort each sensor’s local observations
before being sent to the fusion center. This mapping is
designed to prevent the fusion center from inferring about a
private hypothesis, while still allowing it to detect a public
hypothesis. However, finding the optimal mappings becomes
computationally complex when the range of the mapping is
large. In [27], a low complexity linear precoder at each sensor
is used instead. By tuning the linear precoder, the fusion
center is again prevented from inferring a private hypothesis.
However, in some cases, the error detection rate of the public
hypothesis may deteriorate significantly.
In this paper, we propose a multilayer sensor network
architecture to achieve a better trade-off between information
privacy and inference of the public hypothesis. Our inspiration
comes from neural networks, a multilayer nonlinear structure
that has been validated in various applications to be a flexible
representation system for feature extraction and learning [28],
[29]. Our experiments suggest that using a multilayer nonlinear
structure in a sensor network has the potential to balance
the distortion in information related to the private hypothesis
and the representation of the public hypothesis. In particular,
information from one layer of sensors is first linearly weighted
with a weighting matrix before sending to all sensors in the
next layer. Each sensor in the next layer then uses a nonlinear
function to fuse the information it has received, before re-
peating the procedure. The nonlinear fusion function is fixed,
but the weighting matrices are optimized so that detecting
the private hypothesis at the final fusion center is difficult,
while keeping the accuracy of detecting the public hypothesis
reasonable. Our optimization framework can be shown to
achieve information privacy with high probability. However,
our optimization formulation is a non-convex program. We
therefore propose a modified mirror descent method to solve
it. We verify the performance of our proposed approach on
three real datasets, which reveal the impact of various factors
like the privacy threshold, the choice of the nonlinear distortion
function, and the number of layers, on the trade-off between
the detection rate of the public hypothesis and that of the
private hypothesis.
A preliminary version of this paper appears in [30]. Our
previous work utilizes the traditional empirical risk mini-
mization approach commonly used in the machine learning
literature [31], [32]. However, in this paper, we adopt an em-
pirical normalized risk metric, which can be shown to achieve
information privacy with high probability. Furthermore, we
have generalized our optimization framework and provided a
modified mirror descent method to implement it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we first present our system model and assumptions. We then
present our proposed multilayer nonlinear processing frame-
work. In Section III, we present an algorithm to design the
multilayer weighting matrices. Simulation results are presented
in Section IV, and Section V concludes the paper.
Notations. We use boldface letters to represent vectors and
matrices. The i-th component of a vector α is denoted as
α(i). The superscript T denotes matrix transpose, and R is the
set of real numbers. We use ‖G‖F to denote the Frobenius
norm of G. The operator vec(·) is the vectorization operation,
while Diag (y) denotes a diagonal matrix with the vector y
on its diagonal. We use ◦ to denote Kronecker product. The
symbol 1{A} is the indicator function with value 1 iff the
clause A is true. Throughout this paper, we assume all random
variables have either probability density or mass functions, and
are defined on a common underlying probability space with
probability measure P. We use pX to denote the probability
density or mass function of the random variable X , and pX|Y
to denote the conditional probability density or mass function
of X given Y .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present our system model and assump-
tions. We propose a multilayer nonlinear processing archi-
tecture, and present the concept of information privacy. We
then formulate an optimization problem for our multilayer
architecture with an empirical normalized risk privacy con-
straint, which allows us to achieve information privacy with
high probability.
A. Multilayer Architecture
Source
private hypothesis
public hypothesis
Fusion center
X1
G11
G12
G1M
XC
GC1
GC2
GCM
Fig. 2. Distributed multilayer nonlinear process.
Let p and q be two binary hypotheses, each taking value
in {−1, 1}. The hypothesis p is the public binary hypothesis
that a sensor network wants the fusion center to detect, while
q is a private binary hypothesis whose true state the sensor
3network wishes to protect from the fusion center. To avoid
trivial scenarios, we assume that min{pq(1), pq(−1)} > 0.
Consider the multilayer sensor network shown in Fig. 2.
Sensors are clustered into C clusters. For each cluster c ∈
{1, . . . , C}, suppose there are nc sensors each observing a
row vector of length k. Let Xc ∈ Rnc×k be the collection of
all sensor observations in the first layer of cluster c, which
is distributed according to an unknown distribution depending
on a pair of hypotheses (p, q). Each sensor in the first layer
applies a linear transformation on its local observation before
sending that to sensors in the second layer. Let Gc1 ∈ Rd×nc
be the (aggregated) weighting matrix or linear precoder used
by the sensors in the first layer so that each sensor in the
second layer receives Gc1X
c. Each sensor in the second layer
then applies a nonlinear fusion function h : Rd×k → Rd×k to
Gc1X
c. We assume that h(·) operates element-wise on each
element of its input argument. Each sensor then weighs the
output of h(·) with Gc2 ∈ Rd×d before sending Gc2h(Gc1Xc)
to sensors in the third layer. This process is repeated until the
fusion center receives
Zc(Gc,Xc) = vec(GcMh(G
c
M−1h(· · ·h(Gc1Xc)))), (1)
where M is the number of layers in the network, and Gc =
{Gcm}Mm=1. Let X = {Xc : c = 1, . . . , C}. The fusion center
makes its inferences based on the received information
Z(X) = [Z1(G1,X1); . . . ;ZC(GC ,XC)], (2)
which is called the sanitized information. The nonlinear func-
tion h(·) is fixed, but our goal is to choose Gc, c = 1, . . . , C,
to make it difficult for the fusion center to detect the private
hypothesis q, while still having a reasonable accuracy in
detecting p. We assume that h(·) and Gc, c = 1, . . . , C, are
chosen such that the following assumption holds.
Assumption 1. The received sanitized information at the
fusion center Z(X) ∈ U ⊂ RdkC , where U is a compact
set.
The above assumption can be satisfied by normalizing the
data input Xc and imposing appropriate restrictions on each
Gc (cf. Section III).
In many applications, we do not know the underlying dis-
tributions relating the sensor observations and the hypotheses.
Instead, we are given a training set (Xi, pi, qi)Ni=1, where each
(Xi, pi, qi) is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
realization of (X, p, q).1 Let Zi = Z(Xi). We assume that the
fusion center has access to the training samples (Zi, pi, qi)Ni=1,
and trains a Tikhonov regularized empirical risk function [31]
as a classifier for p, subject to an empirical risk privacy
constraint for q, which we describe in Section II-B below.
In practice, it may not be practical to have multiple layers
of physical sensors as shown in Fig. 2. However, our proposed
architecture is general enough to encampass different physical
interpretations, including architectures in which part of the
layers shown in Fig. 2 are “virtualized”. For example, each
layer in a cluster can be physically implemented within a
1Throughout this paper, we use superscript to refer to a sensor or cluster
index, and the subscript index i to refer to the i-th training data sample.
Fusion center
Xc is a time series
Sensor 1
Sensor 2
Sensor M
Fig. 3. Each layer in cluster c corresponds to a single sensor.
Gc1
Gc2
GcM
Cluster c is a single sensor.
Fusion center
Fig. 4. Cluster c corresponds to a single sensor, with the multilayer processing
architecture implemented within the sensor.
single sensor, so that a cluster consists of a tandem of several
nodes (see Fig. 3). In this scenario, each node in the first layer
corresponds to an observation time instance of the first sensor
in the cluster, and the observations form a time series for
the first sensor. In another example, a cluster may correspond
physically to a single sensor (see Fig. 4), so that the multilayer
nonlinear processing architecture is implemented as internal
on-board processing within the sensor. Note that since we
adopt a machine learning approach, we have not assumed
any independence structure between sensor observations in our
framework, and we allow sensor observations to be correlated.
B. Information Privacy
Consider the Markov chain q → X→ Z(X), where Z(X)
is the information received by the fusion center. In order to
prevent the fusion center inferring about q from Z(X), we aim
to design the mapping Z(·) such that the posterior distribution
of q given Z(X) does not differ significantly from the prior
distribution of q. We adopt the following information privacy
definition.
Definition 1 ((, δ)-information privacy). For  > 0 and δ ∈
[0, 1], we say that q given Z or its conditional probability mass
function pq|Z has (, δ)-information privacy if
P
(
e− ≤ pq|Z(q | Z)
pq(q)
≤ e
)
≥ 1− δ.
4In the case where δ = 0, the above definition is equivalent
to the notion of -information privacy proposed by [21]. Since
we do not know the underlying joint distribution governing
the sensor observations and hypotheses a priori, and instead
depend on a training sample set to determine the mapping
Z(·), we cannot hope to achieve information privacy with
δ = 0. Therefore, in the following, our goal is to develop
a privacy metric that allows us to achieve (, δ)-information
privacy for any  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), if the number of
training samples is sufficiently large. Following [33], [34],
let φ be a convex loss function, H be a reproducing kernel
Hilbert space (RKHS) with kernel κ(·, ·), kernel inner product
〈·, ·〉, and associated norm ‖·‖. We restrict the rule used by
the fusion center to infer p and q based on Z to be of the
form 〈w,Φ(Z)〉, where Φ(Z) = κ(·,Z) is the feature map of
H. We seek to minimize the empirical φ-risk of deciding p
while preserving information privacy. Let G = {Gc}Cc=1. The
weighting matrices G are chosen to be within a constraint set
G of matrices. The set G is defined in practice to have certain
desirable properties in order to facilitate implementation and
control the complexity of our framework. We consider the
following optimization problem:
min
G∈G,wp∈H
1
N
N∑
i=1
φ(pi〈wp,Φ(Zi)〉) + λp
2
‖wp‖2, (3a)
s.t. min
wq∈H
R(G, wq) ≥ θ, (3b)
where wp and wq are the fusion center decision rules for
inferring the public and private hypotheses respectively,
R(G, wq) =
∑
k∈{−1,1}
1
2|Sk|
∑
i∈Sk
φ(qi〈wq,Φ(Zi)〉) + λq
2
‖wq‖2,
(4)
Sk = {1 ≤ i ≤ N : qi = k}, and θ is called the privacy
threshold. The regularization weights λp and λq are small
positive constants. We call (4) the empirical normalized risk,
since unlike the traditional empirical risk (of which (3a) is an
example), we now have a normalization term |Sk| in (4). It
turns out that this normalization term plays a critical role in
achieving information privacy as one can construct examples
in which using the traditional empirical risk without the
normalization term fails to achieve (, δ)-information privacy
for any given  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) [34]. We need the following
assumption.
Assumption 2. For any w ∈ H, there exists αk ∈ R, bk ∈ R
and rk ∈ RdkC , for k ≥ 1, such that for all Z ∈ U,
w(Z) =
∑
k≥1
αkv(Z)u(r
T
kZ+ bk),
where v(·) is a positive continuous function, and u(·) is a
nonpolynomial continuous function.
An example of a kernel inducing a RKHS H satisfying
Assumption 2 is the Gaussian kernel. We have the following
result, similar to Theorem 2 of [34], which applies to the
commonly used loss functions shown in Table II of [34].
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 and Assumption 2
hold. Suppose that the loss function φ(·) is either an ex-
ponential, logistic, hinge or quadratic loss. Suppose also
that λq → 0 as the number of training samples n → ∞.
Then, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exist ξ > 0, and N0 > 0
such that if N ≥ N0, the constraint (3b) achieves (, δ)-
information privacy with  = log ξ(
ξ−2a(φ(0)−θ+δ′) 1r
)
+
, where
δ′ = min{ξ2r/2a, δ/2}, and a and r are constants associated
with the loss function φ shown in Table II of [34].
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 shows that by using a sufficiently large number
of training samples and choosing θ sufficiently close to φ(0),
we can make → 0 and δ → 0, i.e., achieve arbitrarily strong
information privacy. However, stronger information privacy
leads to a higher error rate for the public hypothesis p. In
the following section, to control the trade-off between privacy
protection and public information detection, we propose model
restrictions on the weighting matrices G = {Gc}Cc=1 , and
an algorithm to determine the best privacy threshold θ and
mapping Z(·) to use.
III. MODEL RESTRICTIONS AND ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, we first propose an algorithm to solve the
optimization problem (3). Then, we introduce model restric-
tions in the form of constraints for the weighting matrices
G = {Gc}Cc=1. We propose a modified mirror descent
approach to solve the optimization problem (3) with model
restrictions, and derive the gradient updates needed for the
case where the weighting matrices are positive semidefinite
(PSD) with small traces.
Writing the privacy constraint (3b) in dual form, the opti-
mization problem (3) is equivalent to
min
G∈G,wp
1
N
N∑
i=1
φ(pi〈wp,Φ(Zi)〉) + λp
2
‖wp‖2, (5a)
s.t. max
β
R∗(G,β) ≥ θ, (5b)
where
R∗(G,β) = −
∑
k∈{−1,1}
1
2|Sk|
∑
i∈Sk
φ∗(−2|Sk|β(i))−
1
2λq
(q ◦ β)TK(G,X)(q ◦ β), (6)
p = (pi)
n
i=1, q = (qi)
n
i=1, X = {Xi}ni=1, and the (i, j)-
th element of the kernel matrix K(G,X) is κ(Zi,Zj). The
function φ∗(·) is the conjugate dual of φ(·).
We derive algorithms to first find an appropriate privacy
threshold θ and then to solve (5) for the optimal G. Since
the optimization problem (5) is non-convex and the problem
dimension is generally large, we adopt a gradient descent
approach in both algorithms.
1) Finding the threshold θ: The gradient of R∗(G,β) in (6)
with respect to (w.r.t.) Gcm can be shown to be
gcm(G
c,β;q, λq) =− 1
2λq
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
β(i)β(j)qiqj
∂κ(Zi,Zj)
∂Gcm
,
(7)
5where an example of how to compute the gradient
∂κ(Zi,Zj)/∂G
c
m for the Gaussian kernel is presented in
Section IV-A. With the gradient in (7), we use an iterative
gradient-based method to solve
max
G∈G,β
R∗(G,β), (8)
which gives us the empirical normalized risk of detecting
the private hypothesis q under the worst case G. Let the
objective value of (8) be θ∗. We then choose θ = ζθ∗ for
a fixed ζ ∈ (0, 1). The algorithm to find θ∗ is given in
Algorithm 1.
2) Solving the optimization problem (5): The optimization
problem (5) can be solved by an alternative minimization
between wp and G. With a fixed feasible G, the mini-
mization of the objective function in (5a) w.r.t. wp can
be obtained through its dual maximization due to strong
duality:
max
α
F ∗(G,α) = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
φ∗(−nα(i))−
1
2λp
(p ◦α)TK(G,X)(p ◦α), (9)
which can be solved using Algorithm 2 to obtain the op-
timal α. Setting wp =
∑l
j=1α(j)pjΦ(Zj), the gradient
of the objective function in (5a) w.r.t. Gcm can then be
obtained as
gcm(G
c,α;p, λp) =− 1
2λp
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
α(i)α(j)pipj
∂κ(Zi,Zj)
∂Gcm
.
(10)
The algorithm to solve (5) without model constraints on the
weighting matrices is detailed in Algorithm 3. In the following
subsections, we consider the case where model constraints
are now included, and propose a modified mirror descent
approach.
A. Modified Mirror Descent for Model Restrictions
We now consider adding model restrictions to the constraint
set G to control the complexity of our multilayer nonlinear
processing framework. A general way to solve the optimization
problem (3) with model restrictions is the projected gradient
method. However, the projected gradient method, in general,
does not have a closed-form solution in each descent step,
making practical implementation difficult. The mirror descent
method allows for a closed-form solution at each descent step,
but it is only suitable for convex problems [35]. Therefore, we
develop a modified mirror descent method for our non-convex
problem (3) with model restrictions. We start off with some
mathematical preliminaries.
Definition 2. Let ψ(·) be a continuous function on a given
matrix space. For any matrices x and y with the appropriate
dimensions, let 〈x,y〉 = Tr(xTy).
(i) If ‖ψ(x) − ψ(y)‖ ≤ L‖x − y‖ for all x and y, we say
that ψ is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant L.
Algorithm 1 Finding θ∗ without model restrictions.
1: initialization: initialize G[0] randomly and set n = 0.
2: repeat
3: Solve the convex problem
max
β
R∗(G[n],β) (11)
by Algorithm 2. Denote the optimal solution as β[n]
and let K[n] = R∗(G[n],β[n]).
4: for c = 1 to C do
5: for m = M to 1 do
6: Let A = gcm({Gc1[n], . . . ,Gcm[n],Gcm+1[n +
1], . . . ,GcM [n+ 1]},β[n];q, λq).
7: Update Gcm[n+1] = G
c
m[n]+∆t
c
mA, where ∆t
c
m
is obtained by backtracking line search.
8: end for
9: end for
10: Set G[n+1] = {(Gcm[n+1])Mm=1 : c = 1, . . . , C}, and
n = n+ 1.
11: until (K[n+ 1]−K[n])/K[n] ≤ 
12: output: θ∗ = K[n+ 1].
Algorithm 2 Maximizing R∗(G,β) or F ∗(G,β) for fixed G.
1: Let K(β) = R∗(G,β) or F ∗(G,β).
2: initialization: Initialize β[0] = 0, ρ ∈ (0, 1) and n = 0.
3: repeat
4: n = n+ 1, t = t0.
5: repeat
6: Update β[n] = Pb(β[n−1]+t∇K(β[n−1])), where
Pb is the projection operator to the domain of φ∗. For
example, for the hinge and logistic loss functions,
applying Pb on each component β(i), where i ∈ Sk,
we have
Pb(β(i)) =

0, if β(i) < 0,
βi, if 0 ≤ β(i) ≤ 1
2|Sk| , (12)
1
2|Sk| , if β(i) >
1
2|Sk| .
7: Set t = ρt.
8: until K(β[n− 1]) ≤ K(β[n])
9: until (K(β[n])−K(β[n− 1]))/K(β[n]) ≤ 
10: output: β[n] and K(β[n]).
(ii) If ψ is strictly convex, its Bregman distance is defined as
Bψ(x,y) = ψ(x)− ψ(y)− 〈∇ψ(y),x− y〉, (13)
where B(x,y) ≥ 0 and B(x,y) = 0 if and only if x = y.
We say that ψ(x) is δ-strongly convex if
Bψ(x,y) ≥ δ
2
‖x− y‖2. (14)
We make the following assumption in this section.
Assumption 3. The gradients in (7) and (10) are Lipschitz
continuous with Lipschitz constant L.
6Algorithm 3 Solving (5) without model restrictions.
1: initialization: Set n = 0 and G[0] to be the final G[n] in
Algorithm 1.
2: repeat
3: Maximize F ∗(G[n],α) in (9) using Algorithm 2, and
let the optimal solution and optimal value be denoted
as α[n] and K[n], respectively.
4: for c = 1 to C do
5: for m = M to 1 do
6: Let A = gcm({Gc1[n], . . . ,Gcm[n],Gcm+1[n +
1], . . . ,GcM [n+ 1]},α[n];p, λp).
7: Update Gcm[n+1] = G
c
m[n]−∆tcmA, where ∆tcm
is obtained by backtracking line search, which
is restricted such that the objective function (5a)
is decreased and the privacy constraint (5b) is
satisfied.
8: end for
9: end for
10: Set G[n+1] = {(Gcm[n+1])Mm=1 : c = 1, . . . , C}, and
n = n+ 1.
11: until (K[n]−K[n+ 1])/K[n] ≤ 
12: output: G[n+ 1].
Recall that after maximizing F ∗(G,α) over α in (9),
F ∗(G,α) is minimized over G ∈ G in (5a). Let Jp(Gcm) =
F ∗(G,α) for a fixed α and G\{Gcm}. To minimize Jp(Gcm)
over Gcm ∈ Gcm, we propose an iterative procedure in Algo-
rithm 4. Let Gcm[n] be the solution in the n-th iteration of
Algorithm 4. From Assumption 3, we have from [36],
Jp(G
c
m) ≤ Jp(Gcm[n]) + 〈∇Jp(Gcm[n]),Gcm −Gcm[n]〉+
L
2
‖Gcm −Gcm[n]‖2. (15)
From (14), for any given δ-strongly convex ψ, we have for
any tcm ∈ (0, δ/L],
Jp(G
c
m) ≤ Jp(Gcm[n])+
〈∇Jp(Gcm[n]),Gcm −Gcm[n]〉+
1
tcm
Bψ(G
c
m,G
c
m[n])︸ ︷︷ ︸
uψ(Gcm,G
c
m[n];t
c
m)
,
(16)
Instead of minimizing the non-convex Jp(Gcm) directly, we
propose to successively minimize the convex upper bound in
(16) over the constraint set Gcm, i.e.,
Gcm[n+ 1] = arg min
Gcm∈Gcm
uψ(G
c
m,G
c
m[n]; t
c
m). (17)
From (16), we have
Jp(G
c
m[n+ 1]) ≤ Jp(Gcm[n]) + uψ(Gcm[n+ 1],Gcm[n]; tcm)
(18)
≤ Jp(Gcm[n]) + uψ(Gcm[n],Gcm[n]; tcm)
(19)
= Jp(G
c
m[n]), (20)
which shows that our proposed Algorithm 4 converges since
Jp(·) is non-negative.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm for successive convex upper bound
minimization
1: input: n,G[n],α[n], ρ ∈ (0, 1).
2: Let Jp(Gcm) = F
∗({Gcm}∪ (G[n]\{Gcm[n]}),α[n]). Set
tcm = t0.
3: repeat
4: tcm = ρt
c
m and G
c
m[n + 1] =
minGcm∈Gcm uψ(G
c
m,G
c
m[n]; t
c
m).
5: until Jp(Gcm[n + 1]) ≤ Jp(Gcm[n]) + uψ(Gcm[n +
1],Gcm[n]; t
c
m) or |Gcm[n+ 1]−Gcm[n]| ≤ .
6: output: Gcm[n+ 1].
On the other hand, R∗(G,β) in (8) is maximized over G ∈
G. Let Jq(Gcm) = R∗(G,β) for a fixed β and G\{Gcm}.
From Assumption 3, a concave lower bound of Jq(Gcm) is
obtained in Appendix B as
Jq(G
c
m) ≥ Jq(Gcm[n]) + 〈∇Jq(Gcm[n]),Gcm −Gcm[n]〉−
L
2
‖Gcm −Gcm[n]‖2. (21)
Again with (14) and tcm ∈ (0, δ/L], we have
Jq(G
c
m) ≥ Jq(Gcm[n])+
〈∇Jq(Gcm[n]),Gcm −Gcm[n]〉 −
1
tcm
Bψ(G
c
m,G
c
m[n])︸ ︷︷ ︸
lψ(Gcm,G
c
m[n];t
c
m)
.
(22)
Similar to (16), we propose a successive concave lower bound
maximization procedure to maximize Jq(Gcm) over G
c
m ∈
Gcm, as described in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Algorithm for successive concave lower bound
maximization
1: input: n,G[n],β[n], ρ ∈ (0, 1).
2: Let Jq(Gcm) = R
∗({Gcm} ∪ (G[n]\{Gcm[n]}),β[n]). Set
tcm = t0.
3: repeat
4: tcm = ρt
c
m and G
c
m[n + 1] =
max
Gcm∈Gcm
lψ(G
c
m,G
c
m[n]; t
c
m).
5: until Jq(Gcm[n + 1]) ≥ Jq(Gcm[n]) + lψ(Gcm[n +
1],Gcm[n]; t
c
m) or |Gcm[n+ 1]−Gcm[n]| ≤ .
6: output: Gcm[n+ 1].
By using the Bergman divergence, we have transformed
a nonconvex optimization problem into a series of convex
optimization subproblems, which allow us to adapt Algo-
rithms 1 and 3 when model constraints are imposed on G.
We first choose a δ-strongly convex function ψ, and then
in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3, we update Gcm[n + 1] by
replacing lines 6 and 7 with Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 4,
respectively. In the next subsection, we provide a specific
example for illustration.
B. PSD Weighting Constraint
As an example, we now consider the case where the
weighting matrices are PSD. Together with the trace restriction
7Tr(Gcm) ≤ rcm, i.e., Gcm = {Gcm  0,Tr(Gcm) ≤ rcm}, for
m = 1, . . . ,M and c = 1, . . . , C. We derive closed form
expressions for line 4 of Algorithms 4 and 5 in this example.
Let ψ(H) =
∑d
j=1 λj(H) ln(λj(H)) with λj(·) represent-
ing the j-th eigenvalue of its argument. Note that the negative
entropy function ψ(·) is a 1-strongly convex function [35].
The minimization in line 4 of Algorithm 4 is given by
min
H∈Gcm
〈∇Jp(Gcm[n]),H−Gcm[n]〉+
1
tcm
Bψ(H,G
c
m[n]).
(23)
To avoid numerical errors that make the computed
gradient non-symmetric, we apply a symmetric projection
P (∇Jp(Gcm[n])) = (∇Jp(Gcm[n]) + ∇Jp(Gcm[n])T )/2,
which is the optimal solution of minY=YT ‖Y −
∇Jp(Gcm[n])‖2F , and replace ∇Jp(Gcm[n]) in (23) with
P(∇Jp(Gcm[n])). Simplifying (23), we have
min
H∈Gcm
〈P (∇Jp(Gcm[n]))−
1
tcm
∇ψ(Gcm[n]),H〉+
1
tcm
d∑
j=1
λj(H) ln(λj(H)), (24)
where ∇ψ(Gcm[n]) =
∑d
j=1(ln(λj(G
c
m[n])) + 1)uju
T
j , and
uj is the j-th eigenvector of the matrix Gcm[n]. The closed
form solution of (24) is given in the following result.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution of (24) is H =
UDiag(λ(H))UT , where U comes from the eigende-
composition of P (∇Jp(Gcm[n])) − 1tcm∇ψ(G
c
m[n]) =
UDiag([σ1, · · · , σd])UT , and the eigenvalues are obtained as
λj(H) =

exp(−σjtcm − 1), if
d∑
j=1
exp(−σjtcm − 1)<rcm;
rcm exp(−σjtcm−1)∑d
j=1 exp(−σjtcm−1)
, otherwise.
(25)
Proof. Since the symmetric matrix can be factorized
as H = UDiag(λ(H))UT , it is obvious that
the eigenvectors of the optimal solution in
H∈Gcm
min 〈P (∇Jp(Gcm[n])) − 1tcm∇ψ(G
c
m[n]),H〉 are the
eigenvectors of P (∇Jp(Gcm[n])) − 1tcm∇ψ(G
c
m[n]) =
UDiag([σ1, · · · , σd])UT . Therefore, the problem (24) is
equivalent to
{λj(H)}dj=1
min
∑d
j=1 λj(H)σj +
1
tcm
∑d
j=1 λj(H) ln(λj(H))
s.t.
∑d
j=1 λj(H) ≤ rcm,
λj(H) ≥ 0, for j = 1, . . . , d.
(26)
With Lagrange multipliers µ and {νj}dj=1, the Lagrangian of
(26) is
L =
∑d
j=1
λj(H)σj +
1
tcm
∑d
j=1
λj(H) ln(λj(H))
+ µ(
∑d
j=1
λj(H)− rcm)−
∑d
j=1
νjλj(H). (27)
Letting ∂L∂λj(H) = 0, we obtain the condition λj(H) =
exp((νj − µ)tcm) exp(−σjtcm − 1). Since the problem (26) is
a convex problem, the optimal solution can be derived from
the K.K.T. conditions:
{λj(H) = exp((νj − µ)tcm) exp(−σjtcm − 1)}dj=1 (28)∑d
j=1
λj(H) ≤ rcm (29)
µ ≥ 0, {νj ≥ 0}dj=1 (30)
µ(
∑d
j=1
λj(H)− rcm) = 0, {νjλj(H) = 0}dj=1. (31)
From (28), we have λj(H) > 0, and (31) shows that νj = 0
for j = 1, · · · , d.
When strict inequality holds in condition (29), we obtain
from (31) that µ = 0, and
∑d
j=1 exp(−σjtcm − 1) < rcm.
Therefore, the first case of (25) is proved.
When equality in (29) holds, we have from (31) that
µ ≥ 0, and ∑dj=1 exp(−σjtcm − 1) ≥ rcm. Further-
more,
∑d
j=1 λj(H) = r
c
m also leads to exp(−µtcm) =
rcm/
∑d
j=1 exp(−σjtcm−1). Therefore, the second case of (25)
is prove. The proof of the proposition is now complete.
Since the maximization problem in line 4 of Algorithm 5
can be transformed into a minimization problem, it can be
solved using a result similar to Proposition 1.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we verify the performance of our proposed
approach using three real datasets: the OPPORTUNITY activ-
ity recognition dataset [37], human action recognition dataset
[38], and a dataset consisting of images of guns and/or cash,
which we have collected and made available at [39]. For ease
of reference, we call our approach the multilayer nonlinear
privacy transformation (MNPT).
To test the effectiveness of MNPT in sanitizing the sensor
information, we try different learning machine techniques on
the sanitized information in order to learn the private hypoth-
esis. In our experiments, we use a support vector machine
(SVM) [31], a convolutional neural network (CNN) [40], and
the softmax classifier with cross entropy cost function [41].
The regularization parameter λq in the SVM is tuned from
[10−3, 102], and the CNN we use is the classic LeNet [40] with
32, 64, and 1024 features in the first, second convolution layer,
and fully connected layer, respectively. As traditional machine
learning algorithms do not perform well on our image dataset,
we also implemented a residual neural network (ResNet) [42],
which is a state-of-the-art deep learning technique for image
recognition. Our ResNet has 44 layers, with initial learning
rate 0.05, which is divided by 10 at the 300-th and 400-th
iterations, and the training is terminated at 500 iterations. The
LeNet and ResNet are trained with a mini-batch size of 100.
We compare with the RUCA approach proposed by [25].
Note that in our proposed MNPT approach, finding the optimal
precoders G is done offline using a set of training data. How-
ever, during the online execution of our privacy framework,
each sensor utilizes its own local linear precoder found in the
offline optimization phase to transform its local observation
independently of the other sensors. This is in contrast to the
RUCA approach, which requires that all sensors send their
8local observations to a trusted curator that then performs a
privacy mapping on the aggregated data.
A. Implementation Details
Recall that in our proposed MNPT architecture, each sensor
applies a nonlinear fusion function h : Rd×k → Rd×k,
which operates element-wise on its input argument, to the
information it receives from sensors in the previous layer.
Abusing notation, we use the same symbol h(·) to denote the
element-wise operator R → R. We consider four choices for
the nonlinear function h(·):
(i) logistic function h(x) = 11+e−x ,
(ii) tanh function h(x) = 21+e−2x − 1,
(iii) rectified linear unit (RLU) function h(x) = max(0, x),
and
(iv) sin function h(x) = sin(x).
Recall that Zi = Z(Xi) = [Z1(G1,X1i ); . . . ;Z
C(GC ,XCi )],
where Xi is the i-th training sample. To avoid cluttered
notations, we let Zci = Z
c(Gc,Xci ) for c = 1, . . . , C. We
utilize the hinge loss function for φ and the Gaussian kernel
κ(Zi,Zj) = exp(−γ‖Zi − Zj‖2F ). We have
∂κ(Zi,Zj)
∂Gcm
= −2γ exp(−γ‖Zi − Zj‖2F )Dcm, (32)
where for 2 ≤ m ≤M − 1,
Dcm = B
c
m(i, j)F
c
m−1(X
c
i ) +B
c
m(j, i)F
c
m−1(X
c
j), (33)
Dc1 = B
c
1(i, j) · [Xci ]T +Bc1(j, i) · [Xcj ]T , (34)
DcM = (Z
c
i − Zcj)[FcM−1(Xci )− FcM−1(Xcj)], (35)
with
Fcm(X
c
i ) =[h(G
c
m · · ·h(Gc1Xci ))]T , (36)
Bcm(i, j) =I
c
m(i) ◦ ((Gcm+1)T · · · [IcM−1(i) ◦ ((GcM )T
(Zci − Zcj))]), (37)
and
Icm(i) =

h(Gcm · · ·h(Gc1Xci )) ◦ (1− h(Gcm · · ·h(Gc1Xci ))),
if h(·) is the logistic function;
1− h(Gcm · · ·h(Gc1Xci )) ◦ h(Gcm · · ·h(Gc1Xci ))),
if h(·) is the tanh function;
1{h(Gcm···h(Gc1Xci ))>0}, if h(·) is the RLU function;
cos(Gcm · · ·h(Gc1Xci )), if h(·) is the sin function;
where 1{·} operates element-wise on its input matrix. The
gradient in Algorithm 2 when K(β) = R∗(G,β) can be
shown to be
∇K(β) = −1− 1
λq
Diag(q)K(G,X)Diag(q)β. (38)
A similar expression can be obtained for the case where
K(β) = F ∗(G,β).
We impose the trace restriction {{Tr(Gcm) ≤ rcm =
1}Mm=1}Cc=1, as discussed in Section III-B. In Algorithm 5,
the weighting matrices {{Gcm[0]}Mm=1}Cc=1 are initialized as
normalized identity matrices. We choose the Gaussian kernel
parameter γ to be the inverse of the median of the set
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Fig. 5. MNPT for OPPORTUNITY activity recognition with M = 2: The
impact of the parameter ζ on the public and private hypothesis error rates.
{∑Cc=1 ‖Zci − Zcj‖2 : i, j ∈ [1, l], i 6= j}, the termination
threshold  = 10−3, the initial step size t0 = 1, and the factor
ρ = 0.8.
B. OPPORTUNITY Activity Recognition
We test our algorithm on the OPPORTUNITY activity
recognition dataset in [37]. The public hypothesis is to detect
whether a person opens or closes a door, and the private
hypothesis is to detect whether he is walking or standing. The
data in columns 64 to 76 (left arm’s sensor), columns 103 to
134 (shoes’ sensors), and that in columns 208 to 210 (door’s
sensor) of “S2-Drill”, over a time horizon of 20 samples is
taken as X ∈ R48×20. The training sample size is N = 50, the
testing sample size is 122, and the regularization parameters
are [λp, λq] = [0.1, 0.1].
In Fig. 5, the public and private hypothesis error rates with
different values of ζ used to define the privacy threshold θ
(cf. Section III) are shown for the case where the network
has M = 2 layer. Fig. 5 shows that both public and private
hypothesis error rates increases as ζ increases, but the error
rate of the private hypothesis increases faster than that of the
public hypothesis. In practice, we usually set ζ close to 1 to
make the private hypothesis difficult to be detected. In our
following experiments, we set ζ = 0.99.
In Fig. 6, we show how the choice of the nonlinear function
h(·) affects the detection performance. We see that the largest
gap between the public and private hypothesis error rates is
obtained under the RLU function. A plausible reason is that
the RLU function induces sparsity in the transformed data and
does not saturate [43]. In the rest of our experiments, we adopt
the RLU function as h(·).
We next investigate how the error rates vary with the number
of layers M . Fig. 7(a) shows that the biggest gap between the
public and private hypothesis error rates occurs at M = 3.
In this dataset, it turns out that the architecture with a larger
number of layers overfits the training data, leading to a worse
performance on the testing set. However, we will see that in
the subsequent examples that in general a larger number of
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Fig. 6. MNPT for OPPORTUNITY activity recognition with M = 3:
Different choices for h(·).
layers leads to better performance. This example also shows
that in practice, to achieve the best performance, one should
tune the number of layers using the sample dataset.
We next try different learning machine techniques on the
sanitized information. From Fig. 7(b), we see that the private
hypothesis error rates under different learning techniques on
the sanitized information are all higher than that when per-
formed on the raw sensor observations, which is depicted as
having zero number of layers. This shows that our MNPT
sanitization approach makes it difficult for these commonly
used learning techniques to infer the private hypothesis.
TABLE I
RUCA FOR OPPORTUNITY ACTIVITY RECOGNITION.
RUCA parameter ρp 10−2 10−1 100 101 102
Public error rate (%) 16.39 13.11 14.75 15.57 15.57
Private error rate (%) 40.16 37.70 39.34 38.52 37.70
Finally, we compare our approach with M = 3 to RUCA,
whose performance under different parameters is listed in
Table I. Although the best private hypothesis error rate of
RUCA at 40.16% is similar to our approach, which achieves
53.28%, the public hypothesis error rate of RUCA is larger
than that achieved by our method. We see that by using more
layers, we can achieve better performance.
C. Human Action Recognition
We test our algorithm on the multimodal dataset for human
action recognition in [38]. Actions are recorded using inertial
sensors and a Kinect camera. The measurements are made
when the person is engaging in one of the following four
activities: boxing, bowling, baseball and tennis swing. The
public hypothesis is to detect whether a person is boxing or
not, and the private hypothesis is to detect whether the person
is playing baseball or not.
In our first experiment, we consider only data from 6 inertial
sensors. We sample 132 inertial measurements uniformly from
the sensors over a time period of three seconds. Each sensor
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(a) The impact of the number of layers M on public and private
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(b) The private hypothesis error rate under different learning techniques.
Zero layer indicates that the learning is applied on the raw sensor
observations.
Fig. 7. MNPT for OPPORTUNITY activity recognition.
forms a cluster by itself, with Xc ∈ R132 for c = 1, . . . , 6.
Every sensor uses the same precoders. The training sample
size is N = 50, testing sample size is 78, the regularization
parameters are [λp, λq] = [0.1, 0.01], and the parameter ζ =
0.9. From Fig. 8(a), we see that the biggest gap between the
public and private hypothesis error rates occurs when M = 4.
Note that in this experiment, a random guess gives an error
rate of 25% since the person may be engaging in any one of
the four activities.
We next compare the private hypothesis error rates under
different learning techniques. From Fig. 8(b), we see that when
applied to the raw sensor observations (zero layer), the private
hypothesis error rates under all techniques are close to zero,
while those for the sanitized information are all above 20%,
and reaching close to 25% when M = 4.
In our next experiment, we include data from the Kinect
camera in addition to the observations from the inertial sen-
sors. 60 coordinates on the human body, modeled as a skeleton,
10
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(b) The private hypothesis error rate under different learning techniques.
Zero layer indicates that the learning is applied on the raw sensor
observations.
Fig. 8. MNPT for human action recognition using inertial sensors.
are tracked and 44 data points are uniformly sampled from
each coordinate’s trajectory, i.e., the 7-th cluster observation
is formed as X7 ∈ R60×44. We set the parameter λp = 0.01,
and other parameters are the same as the previous experiment
using only inertial sensors. Compared with Fig. 8(a), Fig. 9(a)
shows that at M = 4, a bigger gap between the public and
private hypothesis error rates is achieved. This is because the
data from the Kinect camera adds diversity to the available
information. The sanitized information is also robust against
various learning techniques as shown in Fig. 9(b).
TABLE II
RUCA FOR HUMAN ACTION RECOGNITION USING BOTH INERTIAL
SENSORS AND A KINECT CAMERA.
RUCA parameter ρp 10−2 10−1 100 101 102
Public error rate (%) 7.69 8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97
Private error rate (%) 29.49 19.23 19.23 19.23 17.95
In Table II, we see that the private hypothesis error rates
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hypothesis test.
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(b) The private hypothesis error rate under different learning techniques.
Zero layer indicates that the learning is applied on the raw sensor
observations.
Fig. 9. MNPT for human action recognition using both inertial sensors and
a Kinect camera.
achieved by RUCA are comparable with that for MNPT with
M = 4. However, MNPT’s public hypothesis error rate is
around 4%, which is much lower than those for RUCA.
D. Gun and Cash Images
In our last set of experiments, we use a webcam to record
images, which depict a gun and/or cash (dollar notes). See
Fig. 10 for an example. The presence or absence of a gun
is the public hypothesis, and the presence or absence of cash
is the private hypothesis. The gun and the cash are randomly
translated and rotated in each 80 × 80 grayscale image. The
regularization parameters are tuned to be [λp, λq] = [0.01, 0.1],
and the parameter ζ = 0.98. We use N = 100 training samples
and 100 test samples.
We first test the case where if a gun is present, the same
type of gun is always depicted in the image. From Fig. 11(a),
we observe that the largest gap between the public and private
hypothesis error rates occurs when M = 4, with the private
11
Fig. 10. Gun and cash image experiment. The presence or absence of a gun
and cash are the public and private hypothesis, respectively.
hypothesis error rate being 45%, which is close to the error
rate of 50% for random guessing. In Fig. 11(b), we use
various machine learning techniques to detect the private
hypothesis from the sanitized information. It can be observed
that SVM, softmax and LeNet do not perform well even
on the unsanitized information (shown as zero number of
layers in Fig. 11(b)) as these methods are not specialized for
image recognition. We therefore include the ResNet here for
comparison. We see that ResNet achieves a low error rate of
14% compared to an error rate of 47% when we use MNPT
with M = 4.
TABLE III
RUCA FOR IMAGES WITH ONE TYPE OF GUN AND CASH.
RUCA parameter ρp 10−2 10−1 100 101 102
Public error rate (%) 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00
Private error rate (%) 51.00 47.00 44.00 44.00 44.00
In Table III, the largest private hypothesis error rate of
RUCA is close to that of MNPT with M = 4. However, for the
public hypothesis, MNPT achieves an error rate of 5%, which
is much smaller than the 32% achieved by RUCA. This shows
that MNPT is able to achieve a better trade-off between the
public and private hypothesis error rates for this dataset.
In our next experiment, we use a dataset in which if
a gun is present, then it can be one of three different
types of guns. The regularization parameters are tuned to be
[λp, λq] = [0.01, 0.01], and the parameter ζ = 0.999. We use
N = 300 training samples and 300 testing samples. Fig. 12(a)
shows that M = 5 provides the best trade-off between public
hypothesis detection and protection of the private hypothesis.
Furthermore, Fig. 12(b) shows that, under different learning
techniques, the private hypothesis error rates of the sanitized
images are higher than those for the raw images.
TABLE IV
RUCA FOR IMAGES WITH THREE TYPES OF GUN AND CASH.
RUCA parameter ρp 10−2 10−1 100 101 102
Public error rate (%) 32.67 32.00 31.67 31.67 31.67
Private error rate (%) 55.33 52.67 52.33 51.67 51.67
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hypothesis test.
0 1 2 3 4 5
Number of layers M
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Pr
iv
at
e 
H
yp
ot
he
sis
 E
rro
r R
at
e
Softmax cross entropy
SVM
LeNet
ResNet
(b) The private hypothesis error rate under different learning techniques.
Zero layer indicates that the learning is applied on the raw sensor
observations.
Fig. 11. MNPT for images with one type of gun and cash.
We see from Table IV that the largest private hypothesis
error rate of RUCA is close to that of MNPT with M = 5.
However, for the public hypothesis, MNPT achieves a much
smaller error rate than RUCA.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a multilayer nonlinear processing frame-
work to design practical privacy mappings at each sensor in
an IoT network in order to sanitize information related to a
private hypothesis while enabling the fusion center to still infer
a public hypothesis based on the sanitized information. Our
approach involves performing a non-linear mapping, followed
by a linear weighting on the information received by each
sensor, which is inspired by techniques used in the neural
network literature. To optimize the linear weighting matrices,
we proposed an empirical risk minimization approach so that
these weights can be learned from a set of training data.
We developed a modified mirror descent method to solve the
12
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Fig. 12. MNPT for images with three types of gun and cash.
empirical risk minimization problem, and provided empirical
experiments that verify the performance of our approach.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof proceeds similarly as that for Theorem 1 and
2 in [34], and we present only an outline of the essential
adaptations here. Let
`(z) =
pZ|q(z | 1)
pZ|q(z | −1) (39)
be the likelihood ratio function. We first show the following
lemma.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that γ(Z) = 1 if
`(Z) ≥ 1 and γ(Z) = −1 otherwise. If R(γ) =
1
2 (P (γ(Z) = −1 | q = 1) + P (γ(Z) = 1 | q = −1)) ≥
θ ∈ [0, 1/2], then for any δ > 0, there exists ξ > 0
such that q given Z has (, δ)-information privacy with
 = log ξ(ξ+2θ−1)+ .
Proof: If −∞ < `(Z) < ∞ almost surely, then
the result follows immediately from Theorem 1(ii) of [34].
On the other hand, suppose that `(Z) is unbounded. Then,
there exist −∞ < `∗ < 1 < `∗ < ∞ such
that P (`∗ < `(Z) < `∗) ≥ 1 − δ and a positive ξ =
min{P (`(Z) ≤ `∗ | q = −1) ,P (`(Z) ≥ `∗ | q = 1)} ≤ δ/2.
Proceeding in the same manner as the proof of Theorem 1(ii)
in [34], we obtain the lemma.
We now proceed with the proof of the theorem. We
follow the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 2 in
[34], except where the assumption that Z takes values from
a finite alphabet is used. Specifically let q˜ be a binary
hypothesis with uniform prior, and satisfies pZ|q˜(Z|q′) =
pZ|q(Z|q′) for all Z ∈ U and q′ ∈ {−1, 1}. Let γ∗(Z) =
arg infι∈R
(
pq˜|Z(1 | Z)φ(ι) + pq˜|Z(−1 | Z)φ(−ι)
)
. We claim
that there exists a γ(Z) ∈ H such that γ(Z) = γ∗(Z) for all
Z ∈ U, i.e., for some αk ∈ R and Zk ∈ RdkC , k ≥ 1,∑
k≥1
αkv(Z)u(Z
T
kZ+ bk) = γ
∗(Z), or
∑
k≥1
αku(Z
T
kZ+ bk) =
γ∗(Z)
v(Z)
.
Since the set of functions {∑Kk=1 αku(rTkZ + bk) : αk ∈
R, rk ∈ RdkC , bk ∈ R,K ≥ 1} is dense in the space of
continuous functions on U [44], our claim follows. The rest of
the proof now follows the same argument as that for Theorem
2 in [34] with δ′ in place of δ and Lemma A.1 in place of
Theorem 1(ii).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LOWER BOUND (21)
From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, for any G and G′ we
have
〈∇Jq(G)−∇Jq(G′),G−G′〉
≥ −‖∇Jq(G)−∇Jq(G′)‖F · ‖G−G′‖F
≥ −L‖G−G′‖2F , (40)
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 3. Let
g(G) =
L
2
‖G‖2F + Jq(G),
then its gradient is ∇g(G) = LG+∇Jq(G). From (40), we
obtain
〈∇g(G)−∇g(G′),G−G′〉 =
〈∇Jq(G)−∇Jq(G′),G−G′〉+ L‖G−G′‖2F ≥ 0.
Therefore, g(G) is a convex function. The lower bound (21)
then follows from and the first order condition g(G) ≥
g(G[n]) + 〈∇g(G[n]),G−G[n]〉, and the proof is complete.
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